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We recently coined the term ‘aphantasia’ to describe the experience of people who lack a ‘mind’s 
eye’ (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), highlighting the features of lifelong aphantasia in a group of 
21 individuals who had contacted us after reading a popular account of a related paper (Zeman, 
Della Sala, Torrens, Gountouna, McGonigle, & Logie, 2010) by Carl Zimmer in the science magazine 
Discover (Zimmer, 2010). Several consistent characteristics emerged: most participants discovered in 
their ‘teens or twenties, to their surprise, that when others spoke of ‘visualising’ items in their 
absence, these others had a genuinely ‘visual’ experience; the majority of our participants, in fact, 
had some experience of visual imagery from visual dreams or from involuntary ‘flashes’ of imagery 
occurring, for example, at sleep onset: their aphantasia thus involved a deficiency of voluntary 
imagery rather than a total absence; in general, the emotional consequences of discovering their 
aphantasia were modest; most participants regarded their autobiographical memory as poor. 
In their commentary ‘Refusing to imagine? On the possibility of psychogenic aphantasia’, de Vito and 
Bartolomeo draw attention to the possibility that in some cases at least, aphantasia may have a 
‘psychological’ or ‘functional’ basis. The title of the commentary, ‘refusing to imagine’, suggests that 
the psychological process might involve an element of choice. We agree with these authors that 
‘psychological’ factors such as mood can influence imagery, and that a full assessment of aphantasia 
should include a ‘psychopathological examination’. We also agree that almost every clinical 
phenomenon exists in a ‘factitious’ form. However, their commentary provokes additional thoughts.  
De Vito and Bartolomeo allude to the traditional distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘organic’, 
referring specifically to the debate concerning the aetiology of retrograde amnesia (for contrasting 
views see De Renzi, 2002 and Kopelman, 2002). There is undoubtedly a useful working distinction 
between irreversible, structural causes of neuropsychological symptoms and reversible, functional 
ones. However the familiar distinction between the ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ is a dubious one: we 
are all organisms, and our functions and dysfunctions are therefore, necessarily, organic. The 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3 
 
neurologist Kinnier Wilson stated this point in especially uncompromising terms in a famous passage 
in his textbook: the ‘antithesis between ‘organic’ and ‘functional’ disease states … lingers at the 
bedside and in medical literature, though it is transparently false and has been abandoned long since 
by all contemplative minds’ (Kinnier Wilson, 1940). We suspect that De Vito and Bartolomeo would 
agree. We labour the point here because it suggests the interesting hypothesis – echoed in 
discussions of retrograde amnesia (Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002), as de Vito and Bartolomeo point out 
– that aphantasia will involve some common pathways in the brain whether it is due to due to 
reversible, ‘psychological’ or irreversible, ‘structural’ causes.  
De Vito and Bartolomeo draw attention to controversy surrounding Charcot’s famous case of 
aphantasia, the case of Monsieur X (Charcot, 1889). In the absence of brain imaging data or post 
mortem findings, the aetiology of Monsieur X’s loss of imagery will never be known with certainty. It 
is true, as de Vito and Bartolomeo point out, that Monsieur X had been under unusual stress prior to 
the onset of his symptoms, and had fallen prey to uncharacteristic anxiety and low mood. These 
features could set the scene for ‘psychogenic aphantasia’. Several aspects of this complex case, 
however, point to a neurological basis for his aphantasia, including the abrupt onset of Monsieur X’s 
symptoms, their association with prosopagnosia and some disturbance of colour vision. Moreover 
his symptoms persisted despite an apparently successful readjustment to his new mental 
circumstances: ‘He realised, moreover, little by little, that he could by other means, by invoking the 
aid of other forms of memory, continue to successfully direct his business affairs. And thus, at the 
present time, he has become reconciled to the new situation…’ (Charcot, 1889, page 154). While 
Zago et al (Zago et al., 2011) argue for a psychological reading of Monsieur X’s case, Young and van 
de Wal (Young & van de Wal, 1996), contrary to de Vito and Bartolomeo’s account, underline the 
remarkable degree to which Charcot’s lecture anticipates the themes of subsequent descriptions of 
aphantasia. They do note with surprise, however, that Charcot failed even to consider the possibility 
of a psychological explanation in this case, given his interest in hysteria. 
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The data we presented from our series of 21 participants were derived from a questionnaire survey 
and lacked the systematic, psychological detail we hope to include in a future face-to-face study. 
However, several considerations suggest that these individuals’ aphantasia is unlikely to have a 
primarily ‘psychopathological’ explanation. All participants described a characteristic of their mental 
lives that was, so far as they knew, lifelong.  Aphantasia was a stable state rather than a variable 
trait. Few described any major emotional concomitants. Most were leading fulfilling personal and 
professional lives. We are impressed by one further association: impoverishment of imagery appears 
to be common in congenital prosopagnosia (Gruter et al., 2009). While our 21 participants did not 
specifically report problems with face recognition, it is likely that there is some overlap between 
aphantasia and congenital prosopagnosia, a condition few would regard as predominantly 
‘psychogenic’.  
The vividness of self-reported visual imagery varies widely among healthy individuals (McKelvie 
1995). In addition to this normal variation, the existing literature points to a range of pathological 
and pharmacological factors that can influence vividness. It can be dimmed or abolished by brain 
injury (Farah, 1984). Depression, anxiety and depersonalisation can have similar effects (Sierra, 
2009), whereas imagery is heightened in psychopathologies such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
and by hallucinogens like mescaline and LSD (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). In all these cases the 
precision of self-report is open to question, but the vagaries of introspection are unlikely to account 
entirely for the wide range of variation described both within and between individuals.  
Thus, in essence, we fully agree with de Vito and Bartolomeo that psychological and psychiatric 
factors should be taken into account in the assessment of a person complaining of aphantasia. These 
factors will themselves have neural correlates. We are doubtful that psychopathology plays a major 
role among people reporting lifelong aphantasia.  
History sometimes repeats itself: a further account by Carl Zimmer of our recent paper, in the New 
York Times (Zimmer, 2015), has prompted around a thousand individuals with aphantasia to make 
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contact with us, attesting to the popular interest and relative obscurity of this fascinating variation 
of human experience. We look forward to future explorations of the experiential, 
neuropsychological, neuropsychiatric and neural features of aphantasia.  
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